制度经济学

学分：3学分

先修课程：在修本课程之前，学生不仅应该掌握一般性经济理论，同时应该掌握相关的历史与人文知识。我们认为学生具有微观经济学和宏观经济学的初级知识，并且熟悉和了解博弈论。

课程简介：

1．制度经济学入门

制度的定义；制度与组织；社会组织的功能；情景互动与社会规范的类型；囚徒困境；协调和实施；社会制度的结构；正式制度与非正式制度；对背离社会规范的约束；社会规范有效性的条件；正式制度与非正式制度的互动；制度模仿的局限；制度实施问题；新制度经济学；现代制度经济学；老制度经济学。

2．交易成本

交易的概念；市场交易和企业内交易；作为经济摩擦力的交易成本；交易成本的两种理论范式；交易成本和转型成本；转型成本与交易成本之间的相互依赖；市场交易成本的类型；最小化交易成本的方法；搜寻和信息成本；度量成本；讨价还价成本；监督和实施成本。  

3．产权

产权的定义；不同法律传统下的产权（普通法和民法）；产权理论；产权的类型；产权束；产权的分割；产权的稀释；外部性的内部化；科斯定理；替代性产权制度；公共产权悲剧；排他性产权及其条件；产权类型化的交易成本；集体产权；最优群体；第一次经济革命；私有产权；公有产权。 

4．契约理论

契约的定义；契约的法律和经济学范式；有限理性和契约不完备性；不对称信息和机会主义行为；逆向选择和市场坍塌；信号发送，自选择；产权的可塑性与道德风险；委托-代理问题与代理成本；控制和预防道德风险；

案例研究：美国储蓄贷款协会的道德风险问题。

交易属性和合约选择；协同效应；准租金；敲竹杠；契约的类型（古典型、新古典型和关系型）；替代性政府治理结构（市场、和机制和科层）；资产专用性及其保障；制度环境以及对合约选择的影响；信任的作用；信任的经济学；信任的类型；内部结构与正式组织（交易成本视角）。

5．企业理论

新古典企业理论；制度理论对企业的解释；市场与企业；替代性协调机制的比较分析；内部市场与影响成本；企业的边界；企业的所有权结构；所有者-监督者理论；经济组织的竞争形式；比较优势和替代性结构；所有权分割与公众公司治理；经理人的机会主义行为与公司管控；内部人和外部人的公司治理；俄罗斯和其他转型经济中的私有化与公司治理。

6．国家理论

对开放通道的社会限制机制；国家的契约理论；霍布斯的国家理论；诺斯的国家理论；俄罗斯与中国经济中的国家规制。

7．制度变迁

制度的稳定性与制度变迁；制度均衡；制度变迁的源泉；集中的和自发的制度变迁；制度变迁过程中的国家角色；制度变迁中对受损群体的补偿；净胜与有效制度的筛选；制度变迁和路径依赖；路径依赖的形式（弱形式，半强形式和强形式）。

教学目标和效果：

1．使学生了解制度经济学在近期的发概况。

2．介绍并使学生掌握制度经济学的基本概念和分析方法。

3．使学生理解经济的制度结构决定经济行为人激励的内在机制。

4．帮助学生理解制度环境在经济理论和商业实践中的作用。

考核方式：

论文 （3000-5000字，占30%）;

案例研究展示 (20分钟，30%),

考试(100分钟；占40%)

Institutional Economics

Credits: 3 Credits

Pre-requisite: Before studying institutional economics students should master not only the fundamentals of general economic theory but have knowledge of the historical courses and humanities as well. Students are supposed to be competent in basic economic analysis up to the level of the Introductory Microeconomics and Microeconomics and be familiar with the basics of the game theory, economic history and history of economic thought.

Module Description：

1.Introduction to institutional economics

The concept of an institution: attempts at definition. Institutions and organizations. Functions of social institutions. Interaction situations and the types of norms: prisoners’ dilemma-type situation; co-ordination situation; inequality situation. Enforcement characteristics.

Institutional structure of the society. Formal and informal institutions. Sanctions for disobeying norms (self-enforcing sanctions, guilt, shame, informational sanctions, bilateral costly sanctions, multilateral costly sanctions). Conditions of norms’ effectiveness.

Interaction of formal and informal institutions. The limits of imitations of institutions from best-performing countries. The problems of their enforceability. The new institutional economics and modern institutionalism. Old institutionalism.

2.Transaction costs

The concept of transaction. Market and intrafirm transactions. Transaction costs as friction in the economy. Two main theoretical approaches to the notion of transaction costs. Transaction costs and transformation costs. Interdependency between transaction costs and transformation costs. Types of market transaction costs and means of  transaction costs minimization. Search and information costs, Measurement costs. Bargaining costs. Supervision and contract enforcement costs.  

3.Property rights theory

The definition of property rights. Property rights in different legal traditions (common law and civil law traditions). The property rights approach: some basic concepts. Specification of property rights, the bundle of rights, partitioning of property rights, attenuation of property rights. Assigning property rights: the internalization of externalities. The Coase Theorem. Critic of Coase.

Alternative property rights regimes. Common property (open access) and the tragedy of the commons. Exclusive property rights and the conditions for their emergence.  Transaction costs of property rights specification. Communal property. Optimal group size. The First economic revolution. Private property. Public property.

4.Contracts

The definition of a contract. Legal and economic approach to contracts. Bounded rationality and contractual incompleteness. Asymmetric information (hidden characteristics, hidden information / hidden action, hidden intentions) and opportunistic behavior. Adverse selection and the closing of markets. Signaling, screening and self-selection.

Asset plasticity and moral hazard. Principal-agent problem and agency costs. Controlling and preventing moral hazard (controlling the agent, incentive contracts, bonding, do-it-yourself). Case study: crisis of the savings and loan associations in America as an example of moral hazard in financial markets.

Attributes of transactions and the choice of a contract. Asset specificity, types of specific assets. Synergy effects, quasi-rents appropriation and hold-up problem. Classification of contracts (classical, neoclassical and relational contracting). Discrete alternative governance structures: market, hybrids and hierarchy. Hybrids: specific assets and their safeguards.

Institutional environment and the role it plays in the choice of contract. The role of trust. Economic approach to trust. Types of trust (contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust). Explaining the internal structure of formal organizations: transaction costs approach.

5.Institutional theories of the firm

Neoclassical theory of the firm. Explanations of the firm in the new institutional theory (F.Knight, R. Coase, Simon H., A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, O.Williamson, O.Hart).

The market and the firm. Comparative analyses of the alternative coordination forms. Internal market and influence costs. The boundaries of the firm.

Ownership structure of the firm. A theory of the owner-monitor (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).

Competing forms of economic organization, relative advantages of alternative structures (proprietorships, partnerships, open corporation, regulated firms, public enterprises, nonprofit organizations, labor-managed firms).

Separation of ownership and control in the open corporation. Opportunistic behavior of  managers and  corporate control. Outsider and insider corporate governance. Privatization in Russia and other transition economies and corporate governance.

6.Economic theory of the state

Social mechanisms for constraining open access. Contractual theories of the state (Locke, Rousseau), Hobbes predatory theory of the state. North’s model of the state. The regulatory role of the state in both Chinese and Russian economy.

7.Institutional Change

Stability of institutions and institutional change. The concept of institutional equilibrium. The main sources of institutional change. Centralized and spontaneous institutional change. The role of the state in the process of institutional change. The problem of the compensation of disadvantaged groups.

Selection of efficient institutions in the process of competition (Alchian, Friedman). Institutional change and path dependence. Forms of path-dependence (weak form, semi-strong and strong forms).

Learning Outcome and Objectives：

1.To provide an overview of recent developments in the field of institutional economics.

2.To introduce the basic concepts and techniques related to the subject.

3.To show the students how the institutional structure of economy determines the incentives of economic agents.

4.To help the students in their understanding of the role of institutional environment in economic theory and in business practice.

Assessment：

Essay (3000-5000 words, 30%);

Case study presentation (20 min, 30%)

Test (100 min, 40%)